Transitional Justice in the Middle East and North Africa:Taking Account of Islam by Yusuf, Hakeem
 
 
University of Birmingham
Transitional Justice in the Middle East and North
Africa
Yusuf, Hakeem
DOI:
10.1515/mwjhr-2017-0010
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Yusuf, H 2017, 'Transitional Justice in the Middle East and North Africa: Taking Account of Islam', Muslim World
Journal of Human Rights, pp. 145. https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2017-0010
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
1 
 
Transitional Justice in the Middle East and North Africa – Taking 
Account of Islam 
Hakeem O. Yusuf 
The Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) has a longstanding experience of 
authoritarianism and conflict.
1
 Despots in the region positioned themselves as ‘bulwarks 
against the rise of Islamism’,2  ruling with impunity and gross violations of human rights with 
the support of Western governments.
3
 The situation in the MENA continues to have 
significant impact on the course of international relations, world trade and global politics and 
lately, the emergence of a humanitarian crisis of grave proportions that has led to mass 
migration to Europe.  Authoritarianism and conflict in the region has spawned violence and 
extremism across the world. The recent experience of the ‘Arab awakening’4 – a revolt 
against authoritarianism in the region – in the MENA has led to limited opening up of the 
political space even if with limited gains such as the institution of democratic governance in 
Tunisia and the now paradoxical democratic process in Egypt. This trend is expected to 
intensify as the Arab awakening takes firmer hold in the various states across the MENA 
given that its impact has produced change that has not been witnessed in about six decades in 
the region.
5
 There is also political transition in post-war Iraq. Each of these situations and 
others across the MENA calls to mind the relevance of measures to address the needs of 
                                                 
1
 Dadush, Uri, and Michele Dunne. 2011. “American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the 
Big Idea?”Washington Quarterly: 131-145. 
2
 Soguk, Nevzat. 2011. “Uprisings in ‘Arab Streets’, Revolutions in ‘Arab Minds’! A Provocation.” 
Globalizations 8(5): 595-599, 596; Ramadan, Tariq. 2012. The Arab Awakening, Islam and the New Middle 
East London: Penguin, 9-10; see also Hanna, Michael W 2014.  “God and the State in Egypt” World Policy 
Journal  
http://www.worldpolicy.org/god-and-state-egypt  Accessed 07 June 2017. 
3
 Ottaway, David B. 2010. “The Arab Tomorrow” Wilson Quarterly 48 
 https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/winter-2010-the-arab-tomorrow/the-arab-tomorrow/ Accessed 07 June 
2017; Gray, Doris H. and Terry Coonan. 2013. “Notes from the Field: Silence Kills! Women and the 
Transitional Justice Process in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia” International Journal of Transitional Justice 7 (2): 
348-357; African Union Panel of the Wise. 2013. Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa Opportunities 
and Challenges in the Fight against Impunity New York: The African Union Series. 
4
 More popularly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. 
5
Soguk 2011, 595-596; Dadush and Dunne 2011, 131. 
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victims and institutional reforms in various parts of the region.  There is both a normative and 
pragmatic need to provide redress for the gross violations of human rights that have ensued 
from mostly the actions of the state but also from non-state actors in the region at some point 
in time with some countries requiring processes of transitional justice at this time as is now 
the case in Tunisia, and others conceivably in a not too distant future as with Iraq for 
instance.  
The core of the argument of this article is that the integration of Islamic notions of justice into 
transitional justice mechanisms in the MENA makes for a more viable and sustainable 
transitional justice process in the region. This would mean a critical cultural value in the 
MENA is given a place in dealing with the past and mapping out a sustainable future in the 
region. The argument here is premised on the logic that a social transformation-focused 
enterprise like transitional justice ought to engage with Islam for sustainable outcomes in 
societies in the MENA where Islam is very influential.
6
 Given the significant role and 
influence of Islam on cultural, socio-political and legal institutions in the MENA, a process 
of transitional justice that takes account of Islamic values and practices is important for 
negotiating justice and institutionalising reforms in societies in the region.  
Recognition that religion has a strong influence on human beliefs and attitudes
7
 has led to 
exploration of its role in conflict resolution and peace-building.
8
 There is also a developing 
recognition on the need for transitional justice as an interdisciplinary field to engage with 
                                                 
6
 Ramadan 2012. 
7
 An-Na‘im, Ahmed A. 2000. “Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate” Proceedings of the 
ASIL Annual Meeting 94: 95-101; Baderin, Mashood A. 2007. “Islam and the Realization of Human Rights in 
the Muslim World: A Reflection on Two Essential Approaches and Two Divergent Perspectives” Muslim World 
Journal of Human Rights 4 (1): 1-27, 1-3; Sachedina, Abdulaziz. 2009. Islam and the Challenge of Human 
Rights New York: Oxford University Press. 
8
 Smock, David. 2008 Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace. Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace; Shore; Megan. 2009. Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Farnham: Ashgate; Brudholm, Thomas and Thomas Cushman (eds). 
2009. The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge; Huda, Qamarul (ed). 2010. Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in 
Islam Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press. 
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religion.
9
 However, this developing body of work has focused primarily on Christian 
societies. The work of Daniel Philpott is the most prominent in this regard, suggesting that 
Christianity has had a strong positive impact on the process of truth-telling and a moderate 
but nonetheless noticeable one on punitive justice measures.
10
 Many majority-Muslim 
societies have been at the coal-face of conflict and authoritarian rule, but there is sparse 
consideration given to the need to engage with Islam in the design and implementation of the 
transitional justice mechanisms and processes. Recent developments around transitional 
justice in the MENA in the shadows of the Arab-awakening inform the need to address this 
important gap which is the aim of this article. 
 
The structure of this article is as follows:  Section one examines the concern about the 
legitimacy of transitional justice processes generally and with specific reference to the 
MENA.  The legitimacy of social, legal and political processes is important to their viability 
and this is the case also (if not more so) for a contentious and typically ambitious project of 
transitional justice in post-authoritarian or post-conflict societies. Section two examines the 
pattern of exclusion of religion from transitional justice and argues that this is one of the 
problematic ways in which the processes and mechanism sometimes lack legitimacy. Section 
three advances the case for taking account of Islam in transitional justice processes in the 
MENA. What emerges from the analysis is that a combination of three factors firmly suggest 
the positive need to recalibrate current and future transitional justice in the region to take 
account of Islam: the reality that there is a religious resurgence across the world; the fact that 
                                                 
9
 Philpott, Daniel. 2012. Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation Oxford: Oxford University 
Press New York; Philpott, Daniel. 2007. “What Religion Brings to the Politics of Transitional Justice” Journal 
of International Affairs 61 (1): 93-110. Brewer, John D., David. Mitchell and Gerard Leavey. 2013. Ex-
Combatants, Religion, and Peace in Northern Ireland: The Role of Religion in Transitional Justice Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
10
 Philpott, Daniel. 2009. “When Faith Meets History: The Influence of Religion on Transitional Justice” in 
Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman (eds) The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) 174, 182. 
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the MENA is easily one of the regions where religion plays a central role in social ordering; 
and lastly, the affinity of certain transitional justice ethics like reconciliation with religion. 
The conclusion drawn is that a transitional justice approach in the MENA that takes account 
of Islam has significant potential for addressing legitimacy concerns and increasing the 
viability of the project in that part of the world. 
 
Transitional Justice and Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of legal and political processes is important to their viability.
11
 Legitimacy 
has been defined by Tyler as ‘the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements 
are appropriate, proper, and just.’12 Hurd defines legitimacy as ‘the normative belief by an 
actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.’13 For Suchman, legitimacy is ‘a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.’14 Legitimacy is critical to the viability of any organisation, institution or 
mechanism because it allows people to defer to legal and various forms of authority or social 
arrangements.
15
  
Internalised norms of justice play a key role in how people respond to legal measures and 
social institutions. Close alignment between prevalent notions of justice among citizens and 
the law or social arrangements makes for greater compliance and uptake by citizens thereby 
                                                 
11
Tyler, Tom R. and Jonathan Jackson. 2014. “Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: 
Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement” Psychology, Public Policy & Law 20: 78-95; Huq, Aziz 
Z., Tom Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer. 2011. “Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counterterrorism 
Policing: A Study of British Muslims” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 8: 728-761. 
12
 Tyler, Tom R. 2006. “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation” Annual Review of 
Psychology 57: 375-400. 
13
 Hurd, Ian.1995. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics” International Organization  53: 379-
408, 381. 
14
 Suchman, Mark C. 1995. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches” Academy of 
Management Review 20 (3) 571-610, 574. 
15
 Tyler, Tom R. 2006. Why People Obey the Law 2
nd
 ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
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reducing the cost of enforcement of laws and improving viability of social arrangements as 
applicable.
16
 Social institutions require legitimacy ‘to develop, operate and reproduce 
themselves effectively’.17  Thus, legitimacy is relevant for example to the work of national, 
regional and international courts.
18
 International human rights and criminal justice courts and 
tribunals have struggled with legitimacy issues.
19
 The concern about legitimacy and the 
challenge it poses to their work is one of the major reasons why unlike domestic courts, 
public outreach programmes are considered critical to the success and viability of 
international (ised) tribunals.
20
 This is to ensure they convey their work procedures (including 
prosecutorial choices) to their publics and connect with the local environment.
21
 
There are two main forms in which legitimacy is analysed in political philosophy and legal 
theory. There is the descriptive or sociological form which focuses on whether those who are 
the subject of a specific policy, norm, policy, institution, unit or body like the state or an 
organisation, view it as legitimate and thus deserving of their compliance.
22
 The second form 
of legitimacy is normative in nature and this takes into account whether the assumption 
underlying the descriptive sense of the concept is correct by investigating if it fulfils certain 
                                                 
16
 Tyler 2006; Jackson, Jonathan, Ben Bradford, Mike Hough, Andy Myhill, Pau Quinton and Tom R. Tyler. 
2012. “Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions” British 
Journal of Criminology 52: 1051-1071. 
17
 Jackson et al 2012, 1051. 
18
 Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1995. “The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: 
Compliance, Support and the European Court of Justice” American Journal of Political Science 39:459-489; 
Gibson, James L., Gregory A.  Caldeira and Lester K. Spence. 2003. “Measuring Attitudes toward the United 
States Supreme Court” American Journal of Political Science 47: 354-367. 
19
 Dzehtsiarou, Kanstantsin. 2015. European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human  
Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Çalı, Basak, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch. 2013. “The 
Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human 
Rights” Human Rights Quarterly 35 (4): 955-984; Gerard Janneke H. and Joseph Fleurens. 2014 
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National 
Case Law: A Comparative Analysis. Antwerp: Intersentia.  
20
 Clark, Janine .N. 2009. “International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach” International 
Criminal Law Review 9: 99-116. 
21
 Oomen, Barbara. 2009. “Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: The Example of Rwanda’s 
Multi-layered Justice Mechanisms”. In Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, 
Peace and Development edited by Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda, 175-202, 184. Berlin: 
Springer. 
22
 Meyer, Lukas H. and Pranay Sanklecha. 2009. “Introduction: Legitimacy, Justice and Public International 
Law: Three Perspectives”. In Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law edited by Lukas H. Meyer, 1-28, 
2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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conditions.
23
 Both the descriptive and normative forms of legitimacy are important to the 
operationalization of transitional justice as a project driven by the international human rights 
movement, seeking to secure justice for victims of gross violations of human rights and 
bringing about social reforms in troubled societies.  The justice and rule of law arrangements, 
as well as institutional reforms which are the purview of transitional justice mechanisms and 
processes in periods of political change, have to be delivered to varying societies across the 
world. However, neither justice nor the rule of law – or for that matter, human rights – is 
value-free. Conceptions of social reform, institutional organisation or indeed, the notion of 
the ‘good society,’24 are all value-laden as no legal, social or political system operates in a 
vacuum.  
It is possible to construct a legitimacy model for transitional justice. Oomen offers a general 
model of the legitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms and institutions. The model 
proposes three components of legitimacy: input, demos and output. The input element refers 
to seeking out the design of the transitional justice mechanisms and processes from the 
people and society affected by the violations in issue, taking into consideration among others, 
their religious values and world view. The demos have to do with the acceptance by the 
relevant stakeholders of the authority which sets-up the transitional justice mechanisms, 
while the output refers to the outcomes of the processes. Each strand of legitimacy must be 
                                                 
23
 Meyer and Sanklecha 2009. 
24
For conceptions of and debates on the notion of the good society, see the contributions in Symposium: The 
Constitution and the Good Society (2000-2001) 69 (5) Fordham Law Review (focusing on constitutional 
perspectives); Etzioni, Amitai. 2003. “The Good Society” Seattle Journal for Social Justice 1 (1): 83-96 (for a 
sociological perspective); Galbraith, John.K. 1994. “The Good Society Considered: The Economic Dimension” 
Journal of Law and Society 21 (2): 165-170 (presenting an economic view); Castaneda, Hector N. 1975. “The 
Good Society and the Complexity of the Structure of Morality” Iustitia 3 (1): 55-66 (a moral philosophy 
perspective); the various contributions to the special issue Davis, D.H (ed.) Reflections on Moral Decline in 
America: Consulting the Founding Fathers’ Views on the Roles of Church and State in Crafting the Good 
Society (2000) 42 (2) Journal of Church and State (discussing the implications of the church/state divide). The 
point here is not the various dimensions (and there is no doubt these are important), but how each dimension is 
intrinsically informed by certain political, economic and socio-cultural values as well as visions of the 
individual and society. 
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established to optimise transitional justice.
25
 Arguably, the input aspect remains the most 
critical element as it would have significant implications for the nature of the demos and the 
output in some form or the other. That input element is the main concern of the analysis here. 
 
In light of the contemporary roots of transitional justice in universal human rights and 
democratisation agenda of the post-World War II period,
26
 it is not unexpected that the 
legitimacy of transitional justice arrangements has come under scrutiny.
27
 In any case, as 
mentioned earlier, justice mechanisms at various levels have faced legitimacy challenges. 
Questions have been raised about the legitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms and 
processes.
28
 This has been the case in recent times with the deployment of transitional justice 
mechanisms in societies and countries in the global south. There is for instance growing 
disenchantment of a considerable number of African leaders and even the African Union with 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for its alleged biased focus on ‘situations’ in the 
continent and selective prosecution to the neglect of other regions deserving of its attention.
29
  
 
However, while the current position of many African leaders regarding the ICC is an 
important illustration of a major challenge regarding the legitimacy of the ICC as a 
transitional justice mechanism, it is fair to note that the legitimacy challenge on this score is 
essentially political. A balanced perspective requires establishing the views of the ordinary 
                                                 
25
 Oomen 2009, 180-183. 
26
 Nagy, Rosemary. 2008. “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections”. Third World 
Quarterly 29 (2): 275-289, 275-276; Moyo, Khanyisela. 2012. “Feminism, Postcolonial Legal Theory and 
Transitional Justice: A Critique of Current Trends”. International Human Rights Law Review 1 (2): 237-275; 
Mutua, Makau. 2015. “What Is the Future of Transitional Justice?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 
9 (3):1-9, 3-5. 
27
Mutua 2009, 3-5. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Imoedemhe, Ovo C. 2015.  “Unpacking the Tension between the African Union and the International 
Criminal Court: The Way Forward”. African Journal of International and Comparative Law 23 (1): 74-105; M. 
Du Plessis, Max, Tiyanjana Maluwa and Annie O’Reilly. 2013. “Africa and the International Criminal Court” 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/0713pp_iccafric
a.pdf. Accessed 08 June 17.  
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people in societies and countries requiring transitional justice measures as result of conflict or 
authoritarian rule. In this regard, it is not clear for instance that the ordinary person in the 
North-East of Nigeria, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Kenya
30
 share the view that African State Parties should renounce 
their membership of the ICC.
31
  
 
The type of challenge to the legitimacy of the transitional justice project as currently 
constituted that is of interest here is the sort of criticism recently made by Abdullah An-
Na‘im. An-Na‘im raised concern that ‘the grand “modernizing” mission of North Atlantic 
societies’ which imposes ‘neo-colonial’ approaches to peacebuilding undermines ‘indigenous 
formations of transitional justice’.32 According to An-Na‘im, 
the implied assumption of [transitional justice]… is that the ‘developing’ society 
under examination is in transition from the state of being A, which we know, to 
becoming B, which we can predict. The precise question or theme of the study may 
vary, but the underlying inquiry seems to be whether that society can still maintain an 
acceptable level of what we, the ‘international community’, recognize as justice 
during transition.
33
 
He further argues that transitional justice ‘must be homegrown, emerging out of local context 
and adapted by the people themselves to the specific conditions of their country, through 
practice, and not as normative ideals imposed from above.’34 In similar vein, Oomen has 
                                                 
30
 Variously facing the scourge of insurgency, civil war, terrorism or other forms of serious violence arising 
from the activities of numerous state actors and non-state actors; military and paramilitary groups, militias, 
terrorist groups, and so on. 
31
 Imoedemhe 2015, 102-104. 
32
 An-Na‘im, Abdullah A. 2013. “Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial ‘Transitional’ to Indigenous Formations 
of Justice’ International Journal of Transitional Justice7 (2): 197-204, 197. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid, 199. 
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argued that legitimacy is the ‘core feature’ that links ‘transitional justice institutions to 
sustainable peace.’35 
 
While identifying with the mechanisms and goals of transitional justice as part of the 
international system, others have called for ‘institutional humility’ of international law.36 In 
this regard, Nickson and Braithwaite have argued for the need for ‘deeper, broader and 
longer’ transitional justice as a strategy for narrowing the rather wide expectations citizens 
have of transitional justice processes and mechanisms.
37
 Broadening transitional justice 
requires it to adopt a ‘holistic, yet multidimensional’ conception of justice.38 On this view, 
justice is ‘immanently holistic’ and holism is an important ‘theme’ of all major world 
religions.
39
 Transitional justice should accommodate pluralistic legal, cultural and religious 
traditions as contributing to justice.
40
 There is reason for universal human rights to ‘build on, 
for instance, religious and traditional values where possible. These two sources do not have 
to be mutually exclusive.’41  
 
Mutua has similarly noted that for transitional justice to become a more ‘robust project’ in 
troubled societies there is a need for close attention to the ‘context and location.’42 Those 
involved in the transitional justice project need to embrace notions of justice that are 
‘informed by a wider moral and social universe’ rather than the deemed normative 
universality of international human rights law.
43
 Such an approach includes at the least, a 
                                                 
35
 Oomen 2009, 195. 
36
 Nickson, Ray and John Brathwaite. 2014. “Deeper, Broader, Longer Transitional Justice” European Journal 
of Criminology 11: 445-463, 450. 
37
 Ibid, 445. 
38
 Ibid, 445, 449. 
39
 Ibid.  450-451. 
40
 Ibid.  450-454. 
41
 Oomen 2009, 196. 
42
 Mutua 2015, 5. 
43
 Mutua 2015, 3-5. Indeed, quite a number of scholars have made similar arguments with regarding for respect 
to human rights. 
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place for Islamic notions of justice in societies where it has resonance. An-Na‘im as well as 
Nickson and Brathwaite’s position have at their core, engagement with the socio-cultural 
milieu of the society which requires transitional justice. This approach also finds support in 
the point made by Habermas for allowing an important place for religious views in the public 
sphere as exclusion of religion would deprive ‘secular society from important resources of 
meaning.’44 Such an approach has strong potential to ‘substantially strengthen the input 
legitimacy’ of transitional justice mechanisms and processes as the adoption of Gacaca in 
Rwanda has demonstrated.
45
  
 
Transitional Justice, the Exclusion of Religion and the MENA 
Some steps towards transitional justice have been taken in parts of the MENA. There are on-
going conversations and debates at both the domestic and international level on addressing 
human rights violations and the design of appropriate transitional justice measures for various 
parts of the region
46
  including Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. There has also been the 
prosecution of a few individuals like Saddam Hussein and few high ranking officials of his 
regime and the trial of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Syria is currently in grave turmoil, caught in 
the jaws of a complex civil war and measures taken in relation to transitional justice in the 
earlier mentioned countries will have implications for securing justice for victims of ongoing 
atrocities there. However, it is relevant to note that the first democratically elected 
government in Tunisia following the Tunisian ‘revolution’ government led by the An Nahda 
Party established a Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice, the first of its kind in 
                                                 
44
 Habermas, Jürgen. 2003.  Future of Human Nature. London: Polity, 109. 
45
 Oomen 2009, 196. 
46
 Abou-El-Fadl, Reem. 2012. “Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and the 
Absence of Political Will”. International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2): 318-330; Eljarh, Mohamed. 
2011. “Transitional Justice, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace in Libya”. Middle East Online 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=49383. Accessed 08 June 2017; Liolos, John J. 2012. “Justice 
for Tyrants: International Criminal Court Warrants for Gaddafi Regime Crimes”. Boston College International 
Comparative Law Review 35: 589-602. 
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the world. The Ministry established the Instance Verite & Dignite, Truth and Dignity 
Commission (TDC) on 24 June 2014
47
 and it eventually began its public sittings in 
November 2016. In Egypt, the inaugural cabinet of the elected President Mohammed Morsi 
included a minster of transitional justice. 
The developments around transitional justice in the MENA, though limited, are connected to 
the fact that transitional justice has assumed the status of a global ethic
48
 with the direct 
involvement of the United Nations, coordinated by an Under-Secretary General.
49
 The 
Tunisian TDC for instance, was the product ‘of a long, participatory process of national 
dialogue that was supported jointly by UNDP and OHCHR, since 2012.’50 Indeed, the TDC 
was formally launched at the opening of an international conference organised by the 
Tunisian government in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
and the New York based transitional justice consultancy organisation, the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice.
51
 Moreover, the significance of transitional justice in the 
international system has recently been amplified with the appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly with a 
mandate on transitional justice measures; ‘promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence’ (Special Rapporteur).52  
 
                                                 
47
 United Nations Development Programme. 2014. “Tunisia Launches Truth and Dignity Commission” 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/06/09/tunisia-launches-truth-and-dignity-
commission.html Accessed 07 June 2017 
48
 Balint, Jennifer, Julie Evans and Nesam McMillan. 2014. “Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing 
Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach”.  International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (2): 194-216, 
198; Nagy 2008. 
49
 Annan, Kofi. 2004 ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: The 
Report of the Secretary-General’. S/2004/616. Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-
rule-of-law-and-transitional-justice-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-societies-report-of-the-secretary-general/ . 
Accessed 08 June 2017. 
50
 United Nations Development Programme 2014. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 18/7; De Greiff, Pablo. 2012. “Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence” United Nations 
General Assembly Human Rights Council A/HRC/21/46. 
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The conversations on transitional justice in the MENA among international organisations 
(IOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), civil society groups, 
scholars and policy groups have proceeded with virtually no reference to religious leaders or 
the role Islam can play in bringing about justice and institutional reforms in the region. To 
illustrate this point, take the views expressed by an important contributor to the discourse: the 
Special Rapporteur. He noted the ‘distinctive characteristics’ of transitions in the MENA in 
this way:  
a common feature of these recent transitions is the prominent role that claims relating 
to economic rights occupy in these transitions; claims against corruption and in favour 
of economic opportunities have been raised to a par in the regions with claims for the 
redress of violations of civil and political rights.
53
 
 
The issues raised are no doubt important as they highlight the need to focus on structural 
injustice or violence – violations of economic and social rights and embedded injustice in the 
social fabric of the societies – but the claim as to their distinctiveness in the transitional 
context is at best late in time. Such concerns are very important but inattention to them by the 
transitional justice project has been raised with reference to transitions elsewhere.
54
 The 
concerns arise from the privileging of civil and political rights in the focus of transitional 
justice and the field’s ‘relatively presentist…concerns’, as Balint, Evans and McMillan and 
                                                 
53
 De Greiff 2012, 6.  
54
 Miller, Zinaida. 2008. “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice” (2008) 2 
(3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 266; Muvingi, Ismael. 2009. “Sitting on Powder Kegs: 
Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2): 163-182; 
Kent, Lia. 2012. The Dynamics of Transitional Justice: International Models and Local Realities in East Timor 
London: Routledge; Mani, Rama. 2008. “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus 
between Transitional Justice and Development” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (3): 253-265; 
Laplante, Lisa J. 2008. “Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the 
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2 (3): 231-252. 
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others have pointed out.
 55
 Transitional justice processes have commonly excluded structural 
injustices linked to major historical events like colonialism and its enduring effects but only 
engage with ‘contemporary episodes of injustice and their recent histories.’56 Arguably, the 
distinctiveness of transitional justice in the MENA is located in identifying and reckoning 
with the dynamics of the socio-cultural norms of justice in the region.  
 
To be fair, the Special Rapporteur’s view is situated in the foundations of contemporary 
practices of transitional justice. The transitional justice template is generally framed in 
secular terms and usually in the legal language of international law.
57
 The current 
developments and arrangements for transitional justice in the MENA have naturally adopted 
that approach. The neglect in exploring the relevance of religion as a viable contributor to 
conflict transformation or securing justice and achieving reconciliation after periods of 
political turmoil or authoritarianism can be linked to the view that religion –  a ‘system of 
belief and practice’–58 particularly in the post-enlightenment age, is an anachronism.  
 
The Northern Ireland experience of transitional justice following the peace process embodied 
in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement (1998) exemplifies the institutionalised view that 
religion and transitional justice should not mix based largely on the foundations of 
transitional justice on international human rights.
59
 Brewer, Mitchell and Leavey have noted 
that while the ‘substance of conflict’ in Northern Ireland ‘was thoroughly political’,60 
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Northern Ireland is such an ‘extremely religious society’61 where even for those who are not 
actively religious, religion is a ‘cultural reality.’62 ‘Religion’ they stated further, ‘is seen as 
both outside the domain of human rights and, indeed, part of the problem that causes human 
rights abuses in the first place.’63 Consequently, the dominance of the ‘liberal human rights 
paradigm’ excluded engagement with the role of religion in the transitional justice discourse 
on the important issue of ex-combatants in the Northern Ireland troubles. This is despite the 
prominent role some religious leaders have played in such processes like the case with South 
Africa
64
 and Sierra Leone. Indeed, the unintended but prominent role Christianity played in 
the South Africa TRC process has been criticised by some scholars.
65
  
 
Brewer, Mitchell and Leavey’s observation on the virtual lack of advertence to religion in 
transitional justice discourse in Northern Ireland is even more acute with respect to the 
MENA and majority-Muslim countries in transition. This is in view of the abiding influence 
of Islam on the lives of Muslims who constitute majority of the population of the MENA. 
Moreover, there is the fact that Islam is a matter of political discourse in the region. As Saud 
observes   
the 21st century has thus far been dominated by talk about Islam and political 
movement within the Muslim world. This talk has not been merely talk, but a political 
discourse according to which military and economic policies have been articulated. It 
is difficult to believe though that Islam is everywhere, yet nowhere to be found when 
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Arab Muslims peacefully pursue democracy; but this is exactly what some experts 
want you to believe.
66
 
 
The exclusion of religion in the formal design and implementation of transitional justice is a 
reflection of the fact that religion has become a contested issue in contemporary societies and 
especially in the West.
67
 The approach manifests the tension between religion and the public 
sphere that gained currency in the post-Enlightenment period in Europe. 
 
Further, there has been much focus on religion as a source of conflict and violence. It is 
undoubtedly the case that many people have and are still being killed in the name of religion. 
So, religion has come to be viewed as a ‘driver of violence’.68 This view finds expression in 
the close association that is made between political or other forms of social violence and 
religion in societies where religion is a prominent cultural fact like majority-Muslim 
countries
69
 and even other countries where Muslims constitute a visible minority as is the 
case in a number of Western countries like Canada, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom.
70
 In the circumstance that religion can and has been mobilised in various ways for 
furthering the cause of conflict, terror and war, it is not surprising that only marginal attention 
has been devoted to what positive role religion can actually play in social transformation in 
societies where it has considerable influence.  
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The experience of increased global visibility of religion in the public sphere has led to a 
description of the 20
th
 century as ‘God’s Century.’71 There is evidence to support the view 
that despite vigorous attempts at secularization of the public sphere, there has been a 
resurgence of the influence of religion in all parts of the world, including Western Europe.
72
 
For example, religion has returned to the public sphere in the former Soviet Republics where 
it was officially repressed or banished into a limited private space. According to Sherrie 
Steiner, more ‘than 90% of people in the world adhere to one of the major religions.’73 Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart have commented on how ‘even in highly secular societies, the 
historical legacy of religion continues to shape worldviews and to define cultural zones.’ 74  
 
MENA and Transitional Justice – Taking Account of Islam 
Religion remains an important part of the socio-cultural experience of many societies and 
especially in the MENA. The three Abrahamic religions originate in the MENA but the vast 
majority of the population (about 90 per cent) are Muslims.
75
 For more than fourteen 
centuries, Islam has had cross-cutting influence on social ordering in the MENA and played a 
visible role in the experience of the ‘Arab awakening.’76 For Laith Saud, ‘the Arab Spring has 
its roots in many things, but of all them the most central is Islam…the historical context 
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within which the revolutions are transpiring is inundated with Islam.’77 Islam remains equally 
an important issue in the post-invasion experience of Iraq and the conflict situation in Syria. 
It is instructive in this regard too that so-called Islamist Parties came to power following the 
fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. There is the fact of influence and, or 
participation in the transitional government in Libya of groups asserting ‘Islamist’ credentials 
in the civil war in Syria, quite apart from the Daesh group.  
 
While previous research recognises the relevance of Islam as one of the Abrahamic faiths 
with viable potential tools and mechanisms for conflict transformation, focus on the potential 
or actual role of Islam in that regard has been marginal. This may be due in part to the fact 
that generally, with the notable exception of the truth seeking process in Morocco, the trial of 
Saddam Hussain and the trial of Hosni Mubarak, there have been hardly any transitional 
justice measures in the much troubled MENA.
78
 The notable exception is the creation of the 
Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Tunisia which has established a truth-
telling process as mentioned earlier.
79
  This situation, Worden et al have noted, owes more to 
‘poor governance’ than to ‘Islamic legal thinking’80 which has a ‘strong justice narrative’.81 
Correlatively, there is sparse research on the role of Islam in transitional societies in 
predominantly Muslim societies and countries.
82
 
 
Religion has much to offer political reconciliation practices now required in the MENA. 
Notwithstanding the framing of transitional justice in secular terms, important aspects of the 
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conceptual approach of transitional justice, even if only subliminally, lend themselves to 
identification with important religious values of truth, forgiveness and reconciliation. This is 
because religion is a major ‘carrier’ of ethics of reconciliation. Religion has the potential for 
making major contributions to the conception of justice by believers in dealing with past 
experiences of injustice.
83
 In this regard, Philpott has identified an ‘ethic of political 
reconciliation’ in societies recovering from a legacy of injustice. This ethic finds ‘thorough’ 
expression in religion, specifically, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As a ‘restorative ethic,’ 
reconciliation animates six critical practices relevant to ‘political proceedings’: building 
socially just institutions, acknowledgment, reparations, punishment, apology and forgiveness 
even though combinations of these would be regarded as odd bed fellows in the ‘liberal 
human rights paradigm’ institutionalised by the west. He convincingly argues that there are 
sound reasons for recognising an important role for religion in societies recovering from 
troubles whether or not the people are religious. An important reason for this is that secular 
rationales are compatible with ‘religious justifications’ for political reconciliation practices.84  
 
Furthermore, transitional justice processes engage social, cultural, political and legal issues in 
societies in transition. The handling of such issues is strongly influenced by Islam in 
predominantly Muslim societies and especially those in the MENA.
85
 As John Esposito 
observed ‘Islam today is the dominant symbolic and ideological force in the Muslim world 
informing social institutions…and politics.’86 This is because, broadly speaking, Islam as a 
religion embodies a relatively comprehensive code for living in society. In view of the socio-
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cultural dominance of Islam in the MENA,
87
 there is an important need to engage with Islam 
as an institutionalised reference point in the process of justice and social transformation that 
has been heralded there.
88
 Specifically, it is important that Islam be engaged in the process of 
the design and implementation of transitional justice measures which have already 
commenced in parts of the region.
89
  
 
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the case for adverting to Islam in transitional justice 
contexts in the MENA. Meanwhile, with the establishment of international criminal tribunals, 
criminal trials have become one of the most definitive features of transitional justice in the 
post-Nuremberg period.
90
 The prosecutions for gross violations of human rights have been at 
the national, but most prominently, at the international level have followed, in the words of 
Kathryn Sikkink, a ‘justice cascade’.91 According to Luc Huyse, prosecution is ‘by far the 
most radical interpretation of acknowledgment and accountability’92 which are the two core 
features of the transitional justice project. However, the prioritisation of trials in the 
transitional justice project has raised concerns on the appropriate role of victims of gross 
violations of human rights.
93
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The trial process privileges the international system or the State typically relegating the status 
of the victim. Such privileging is problematic in whichever form it takes. The State and its 
institutions (or some of them) is usually directly or at least indirectly complicit in gross 
violations of human rights which are being addressed and this may generate antagonism from 
victims. For the international system, while it may be considered as a positive that it is a 
neutral agent in contrast with a likely complicit State, the fact of its remoteness or distance 
could create other major problems. Victims could feel a sense of disconnection if not 
imposition by the trial process. Either of these may generate in victims, feelings of disinterest 
in the process or lack of satisfaction with the procedures and outcomes. The Islamic legal 
system offers an approach that could be pragmatic especially for a considerable number of 
people in various societies and across countries in the MENA. It is thus important to take this 
into account in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms there. 
However before moving on to that, it serves the argument advanced so far to illustrate with a 
concrete instance of the operation of transitional justice in a momentous period in Islamic 
history.  
A Classic Example of Transitional Justice in Islamic History 
If transitional justice is concerned at least in part with conflict transformation and sustainable 
peace in the context of complex political changes as well as justice, then it is useful to refer 
here to an experience of political accommodation with a view to instituting peace in the 
earliest epoch of the Islamic era.  But before going further it is relevant to advert to the debate 
about the historicisation of transitional justice namely when did transitional justice begin? 
Some have argued that transitional justice is a twentieth century phenomenon (much like the 
view held in some quarters about the history of human rights) which emerged as part of the 
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responses to the experiences of the Second World War.
94
 Others like Jon Elster have, through 
a historiographical account, traced a longstanding practice of transitional justice.
95
 On this 
latter view, seeking justice following periods of wide spread repression or aftermath of mass 
atrocities is not new. David Dyzenhaus states in this regard that it is the ‘label’ (transitional 
justice) that is new, not the ‘topic’. On this account, societies that have desired to break with 
a troubled past marked by injustice and repression have adopted various measures in their bid 
to usher in a ‘better future’.96 It is this approach to the historicisation of transitional justice 
that is adopted here not the least because it highlights and acknowledges, even implicitly, an 
important role played by religion and religious figures in the development of aspects of what 
we now refer to as transitional justice.  
 
It is useful in this regard to illustrate the experience of transitional justice in the classic 
Islamic period as that period of Islamic history continues to have deep resonance with most 
Muslims till today in one way or the other. The conquest of Makkah in 630 C.E is a 
milestone in Islamic history as it marked the consolidation of the Muslim community 
established by Prophet Muhammad and his followers in Madina. The Prophet and his 
followers had been persecuted in Makkah for thirteen years before he and many of them went 
on exile and migrated to Madina. The nascent Muslim group in Makkah had suffered 
deprivation; economic, social and political boycott, physical and mental torture and even, in 
some cases, murder, for a thirteen years in the hands of their own people; the powerful and 
much respected tribe of Quraysh, for accepting the message brought by Prophet Muhammad. 
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Even after the emigration of the Muslims, the nascent community in Madina had to contend 
with economic, social and political pressure from the Quraysh of Makkah who not only 
confiscated their properties in Makkah but also waged war against the Muslim community of 
Madina in several battles.  Following a breach of a negotiated truce between the parties by 
the Quraysh, Prophet Muhammad set out in 630 C.E., eight years after his departure from 
Makkah, with a ten thousand strong army to confront the Quraysh in Makkah. The Muslim 
army overwhelmed the Quraysh who could not put up an effective resistance. The invading 
Muslim army however entered the city with the loss of a few men in skirmishes from slight 
resistance of two clans as the Muslims entered Makkah. At the moment of victory over those 
how had persecuted him and his followers, his now defeated enemies and their leaders stood 
breathless with grave apprehension about their fate. Significantly, Prophet Muhammad 
allayed apprehensions of punishment on the part of the oligarchs of Makkah and declared a 
general amnesty with the exception of four individuals (ten according to some accounts) 
considered the most culpable criminals in the city who he ordered to be punished. The 
Prophet called on his followers to embrace reconciliation and forgiveness of their 
persecutors.
97
 This is only one major instance of the historical application of notions of 
transitional justice within the Islamic tradition.  
 
Arguably, any ethic that claims global relevance like transitional justice 
98
 that ignores 
religion does so only to its ‘detriment.’99 This is especially pertinent in societies where 
religion, and or religious leaders play a ‘pivotal role’ in socio-political affairs, since religion 
can be effectively used as consensus-builder for reconciliation practices.
100
 While the Islamic 
legal system is not currently referenced in the transitional justice discourse generally, and on 
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victims’ rights specifically, it is noteworthy that it provides a markedly different approach to 
participation and status of victims from the dominant system based on international human 
rights.       
 
Broadening Transitional Justice – The Role of Victims in the Islamic Legal 
Tradition 
The Islamic system provides a comparative exception to the relegation of the role of the 
victim by the State in the criminal justice system. Importantly, the system on this score has 
not only a comparative value, but direct relevance in the context of the practice and 
application of transitional justice measures. The Islamic approach to victims offers 
opportunity for broadening transitional justice as conceived by those concerned about the 
rather limited opportunities for justice offered by the current narrow framing of the project. 
Islam provides a central role for victims within the criminal justice framework. This is 
important in view of the fact that criminal justice, as stated earlier, dominates the landscape 
of transitional justice in the handling of impunity. In light of the fact that virtually all the 
countries in the MENA have a socio-legal system which recognizes or operates aspects of 
Islamic law, incorporation of the Islamic perspectives for dealing with impunity provides an 
opening for securing justice for victims of impunity in the MENA as opportunities for 
transitional justice emerge in the region.  
 
Islam as a way of life with a holistic prescription for individual and communal life, has 
prescriptions for crime and the role of victims which constitute part of its criminal justice 
system alongside a civil justice system (with overlaps between the two systems in some 
areas).
101
 The victim plays a key role in the Islamic criminal justice system adapted to 
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varying extents in many Muslim countries. Victim compensation for crimes is a fundamental 
aspect of Islamic law.
102
 The Islamic legal system recognizes three categories of crimes: 
Hadd (plural Huduud), Qisas and Ta’zir. These categories determine the kinds of penalties 
that attach to the crimes and the level of discretion (or lack of it) granted to the judge.
103
  
 
The literal meaning of Hadd is ‘limit’ and in its technical usage, it refers to the limit of action 
set by divine prescription in the foundational or ‘constitutional’ sources of Islamic law; the 
Qur’an and Sunnah (sayings and approved practices of Prophet Muhammad) regarded as the 
normative basis of the Islamic legal tradition.
104
 When this limit is exceed or transgressed, 
then a crime of a serious nature is committed because violating hadd is considered to be an 
offence against God and the socio-legal order God has ordained. In other words, it constitutes 
a violation of limits for action imposed by God.
105
 Hadd offences are mainly regarded as 
victimless crimes, or where there is a victim, s/he is only peripheral to the crime 
committed.
106
 For efficiency and to deter impunity, it is generally considered that prosecution 
of such crimes are best left to the State.
107
 Therefore, the intervention of victims is reduced to 
a minimum in deference to a mandatory regime of punishments prescribed by Islamic law. 
However, where there is a victim whose rights are directly violated, the interest of such a 
victim will be recognized.
108
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There are five universally agreed Huduud crimes in Islamic criminal law: hirabah – highway 
robbery; zina – fornication or adultery depending on the marital status of the defendant; 
sarqa – stealing; shrub al-khamr – consuming alcohol; qadhf – defamation of a person’s 
chastity or sexual slander. There is no consensus on the definition and elements of two 
others; baghi – armed rebellion and ridda – apostasy.109 The State initiates the proceedings 
and the victim generally has the limited role of witness and the offence is deemed to be a 
matter of public nature.
110
 This is because the crime committed is deemed to be disruptive of 
social harmony
111
 and in violation of the five core objectives of Islam (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa): 
the protection and preservation of life, religion, sound intellect, lineage, and property.
112
 
Accordingly, the punishment for such violation is mandatory and as set out in the primary 
sources of Shari’a and Islamic law, just like the offence itself.113 Nonetheless, from a 
practical point of view, the absence of a report by the victim means the crime cannot be 
successfully prosecuted as there are strict evidentiary requirements for establishing such 
crimes.
114
 Moreover, the strict evidentiary rules as well as required social considerations for 
its implementation limit the actual occasions for the appropriate application of punishments 
for hadd crimes. This is the basis for suspending the implementation of the punishment for 
theft in a period of famine for instance.  
Of specific interest are the last two categories of offences: Qisas and Ta’zir. In both, the 
victim is a more active participant because the offences are deemed to usually combine 
violations of public and private rights as against a public right only characteristic of the Hadd 
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category. This is particularly the case with Qisas which means ‘equality in punishment’ or 
legal retribution crimes.
115
 Some refer to them as crimes punished with ‘equivalence’ or 
‘retaliation’ but it is even better captured as ‘settlement of accounts.’116 Qisas crimes affect 
the physical integrity or moral dignity of the individual and they are essentially homicide 
crimes: murder and manslaughter as well as all forms of assault and battery.
117
 In contrast 
with the Huduud crimes, Qisas empowers the (direct) victim or their family (indirect victims) 
to play a central role in determining the fate of the offender. Specifically, Qisas permits the 
victim or their family, to play a central role in sentencing after conviction. They are 
punishable by retaliation or equivalence of punishment if so decided by the victim or the 
victim’s family, by a penal fine or compensation (Diyya) paid to the victim.118 This extends 
to all cases of physical injury and even homicide, voluntary or otherwise.
119
 In this regard, 
the Qur’an states  
O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered - 
the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But 
whoever overlooks from his brother anything, then there should be a suitable follow-
up and payment to him with good conduct. This is alleviation from your Lord and a 
mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful punishment. And there 
is for you in legal retribution [saving of] life, O you [people] of understanding, that 
you may become righteous.
120
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And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, 
an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever 
gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge 
by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers.
 121
 
The foregoing verses indicate not only the important role of the victim, but also the 
paramount nature of the prerogative of mercy or pardon solely conferred on the individual 
rather than the State in contrast with the standard practice in western legal systems. This is 
because, despite the element of punishment, there is clear encouragement of remission and no 
compulsion in the direction of punishment.
122
 There is ample room for forgiveness and 
reconciliation between victim and offender and in some cases, even the families on both 
sides.
123
  
 
Ta’zir crimes are a residual category not covered either by Huduud or Qisas.124 Ta’zir, 
meaning ‘chastisement’ for improper behaviour or discretionary penalty, is also applied 
where though the crime committed is considered to be of either a Hadd or Qisas nature, but 
the evidentiary requirements of either is not satisfied.
125
 Further, it is also applied where there 
is some form of remission on the part of the offender before apprehension and prosecution by 
law enforcement agents of the State. An example of this latter situation would be where the 
robber for instance becomes remorseful, restores stolen property to the owner and thereby 
achieve reconciliation with the victim before arrest. The Hadd punishment will not be 
implemented in such a case.
126
 Rather, the judge is at liberty to apply the ‘rule of lenity’ 
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rather than the prescribed punishment for the ostensible crime committed.
127
 This is 
particularly relevant because the evidentiary requirements of Huduud crimes, as mentioned 
earlier, are particularly stringent
128
 in recognition of the need to maintain the higher level of 
certainty before the application of grievous punishment.  In practice, many situations that 
should be punished as Hadd offences fall to be decided as Ta’zir crimes because of 
evidentiary issues or circumstances leaving room for more transformative experiences of 
offender encounters with the criminal justice system
129
 and implicitly, increasing the scope 
for the active role of victims.  
 
A third form and, perhaps the most common form in which Ta’zir is applied in the Islamic 
criminal (and also civil) justice system is even more relevant to securing justice for victims in 
troubled societies. Ta’zir is a point of reference for harmful or wrong conduct that is not 
explicitly covered by the primary or textual sources of Islamic criminal law.
130
 In line with 
the goals and objectives of Islamic law which gives primacy to the preservation and 
protection of human life and dignity,
131
 such crimes are not allowed to fall through the 
interstices of the rule of law. For such crimes, the political and judicial authorities are 
conferred with flexible authority and discretion to criminalise and punish offenders 
respectively. This aspect of Ta’zir will operate for covering the spectrum of gross violations 
of human rights which are not directly provided for in Islamic law but for which victims have 
suffered deprivations. Both Qisas and Ta’zir are particularly relevant for protecting the rights 
and promoting the interests of victims in the post-authoritarian and post-conflict context.  
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Recent research has suggested that the application of Qisas in the implementation of 
transitional justice in Somalia has strong support because of the ‘long history and cultural 
centrality of Somali Islam.’132 In this regard, Rahma AbdulKadir and Caroline Ackley found 
that  
The esteem in which the respondents hold Islamic values as guides to peace, 
education, and justice illustrates the importance of including Islamic values and 
jurisprudence in mechanisms of transitional justice in Somalia.
133
 
This finding speaks to the significance of legitimacy of transitional justice measures in the 
subject society as a critical issue for their viability as discussed above and with resonance for 
securing justice for a considerable number of victims of gross violations across the MENA 
region. 
 
There is also the significant fact that notable aspects of international humanitarian law form 
an important part of Islamic law developed well over a millennium before the contemporary 
international humanitarian law. Rules of humanitarian law in Islamic laws of war have been 
examined both at theoretical and application perspectives dating back to the classical period 
of Islam; the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors right through 
much of the period of the spread of Islam to different parts of the world.
134
 As Bassiouni has 
argued, Islamic law is not only compatible with transitional justice, but ‘Islamic criminal law, 
by its very terms, demands action in post conflict situations.’135   
 
Conclusion 
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Despite the prominence of religion and specifically Islam in the socio-political and cultural 
life of societies in the MENA, reference to integration of religion in transitional justice 
processes in the region is virtually absent in the emerging discourses and processes of 
transitional justice there. Yet, the strong historical affinity for Islam in the MENA makes it 
problematic to frame the critical project of transitional justice and conflict transformation in 
the region on foundations that excludes religion as is currently the case. For over fourteen 
centuries it has been difficult to conceive of religion in the historical sense in majority-
Muslim societies like the MENA. Addressing impunity - the suffering and gross violations of 
human rights that have ensued from mostly actions of the state but also non-state actors as a 
result of over six decades of authoritarianism and conflict in the MENA – is a pivotal step in 
instituting sustainable peace and development in the region. The main argument made in the 
foregoing is that taking account of religion in transitional justice measures is compelling in 
the MENA.  
 
A major challenge for transitional justice and conflict transformation measures has been the 
need to secure their legitimacy in subject societies to facilitate their acceptance and efficacy. 
In view of this, on-going changes in the MENA and engagement with them through 
transitional justice ought to be considered along with the institutionalised reference to Islam 
in ‘the contemporary Muslim conscience’.136 Specifically, it is important that Islam is 
engaged in the process of the design and implementation of transitional justice and conflict 
transformation measures in the region to ensure their viability and expand the opportunity for 
satisfaction with the rather limited dividends they tend to deliver. This approach empowers 
the societies in transition in the MENA in dealing with social change that has been initiated 
there. It broadens the appeal, legitimacy and efficacy of transitional justice measures in that 
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critical part of the world. These are not simply desirable outcomes for the transitional justice 
project, but crucial to its currently challenged status as a viable endeavour in post-conflict 
and post-authoritarian societies. 
 
 
